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 UK shale gas ‘fracking’ is at a very early stage with an uncertain size of resource.
 Shale gas extraction might benefit UK fuel security, as well as jobs and growth.
 Potentially harmful environmental ‘side-effects’ must be monitored and regulated.
 Gas bills for UK household and industrial consumers are unlikely to fall sharply.
 Costs & benefits of shale gas fracking are unevenly distributed between communities.a r t i c l e i n f o
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There is at present much interest in unconventional sources of natural gas, especially in shale gas which is
obtained by hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’. Boreholes are drilled and then linedwith steel tubes so that a
mixtureofwater and sandwith small quantities of chemicals – the frackingfluid– canbepumped into them
at very high pressure. The sand grains that wedge into the cracks induced in the shale rock by a ‘perforating
gun’ then releases gas which returns up the tubes. In the United Kingdom (UK) exploratory drilling is at an
early stage, with licences being issued to drill a limited number of test boreholes around the country.
However, such activities are already meeting community resistance and controversy. Like all energy tech-
nologies it exhibits unwanted ‘side-effects’; these simplydiffer in their level of severity between the various
options. Shale gas may make, for example, a contribution to attaining the UK’s statutory ‘greenhouse gas’
emissions targets, but only if appropriate and robust regulations are enforced. The benefits and disadvan-
tages of shale gas fracking are therefore discussed in order to illustrate a ‘balance sheet’ approach. It is also
argued that it is desirable to bring together experts from a range of disciplines in order to carry out energy
technology assessments. That should draw on and interact with national and local stakeholders: ‘actors’
both large and small. Community engagement in a genuinely participative process –where the government
is prepared to change course in response to the evidence andpublic opinion–will consequently be critically
important for the adoption of any new energy option that might meet the needs of a low carbon future.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Human development is underpinned by energy sources of var-
ious kinds that heat, power and transport its citizens in their every-
day life. But all energy technologies have unwanted ‘side-effects’;they simply differ in their level of severity. Hydraulic fracturing,
or ‘fracking’, for shale gas is a particularly controversial energy
option that is receiving significant development support from gov-
ernment in the United Kingdom (UK). Licenses have been issued by
the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to drill a lim-
ited number of test boreholes around the country (see, for the case
of England, [1]). These boreholes are then lined with steel tubes,
and a mixture of water and sand with small quantities of chemicals
– the fracking fluid – is pumped into them at very high pressure.
The sand grains that wedge into the cracks induced in the shale
rock by a ‘perforating gun’ then releases gas which returns up
the tubes (see Fig. 1). The UK Government is attracted by the pos-
sible benefits of securing large quantities of shale gas for the UK as
an energy ‘game changer’: leading to a potential ‘Golden Age of
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sees shale gas as contributing about 14% to global gas production
by 2035. However, the exploitation of fracking will involve a range
of advantages and disadvantages (‘credits and debits’) that will fall
disproportionately on different sections of British society. So it is
necessary to identify the components of a shale gas fracking ‘bal-
ance sheet’ of the sort employed in technology assessment [3–5]
in order to evaluate its impact on communities, countryside and
wildlife, and to determine whether it is compatible with Britain’s
move towards a low carbon future in 2050 and beyond.
1.2. Historical development of fracking for shale gas
The technique of hydraulic fracturing began in the United States
of America (USA) [6] in around 1949 when the first two, small-
scale commercial vertical wells were initiated in Oklahoma and
Texas respectively [7,8]. But it was not until about 1997 that the
process known as ‘slickwater fracturing’ was developed and imple-
mented in the Barnett Shale by the then Mitchell Energy. This is a
method that involves adding chemicals to water to increase the
flowrate at which the fracking fluid can be pumped down a well-
bore to fracture extremely dense shale. The fracking fluid is made
up of around 98.50% water, 1.00% sand, and 0.05–0.50% chemical
additives [6]. These chemicals are friction reducers, usually a poly-
acrylamide, together with biocides, surfactants and scale inhibi-
tors. Biocides prevent organisms from blocking the ‘downhole’
and fissures, whereas surfactants keep the sand grains in fluid sus-
pension. Other chemicals that are sometimes employed include
benzene, chromium, and a number of other compounds [6]. North
American fracking companies keep the composition of this chemi-
cal ‘cocktail’ secret, claiming commercial confidentiality, although
an independent study identified about 650 separate chemicals
compounds. However in the UK, companies are obliged under the
Water Resources Act 1991 to disclose the composition used. Many
of these are known to be toxic and widespread concern has been
expressed over potential water contamination [6,9–11]. Neverthe-
less, it was this pressure-induced slickwater fracturing (see again
Fig. 1) that made shale gas extraction economical by radically
reducing the costs of horizontal fracking [6].
The situation with shale gas development in the UK is quite dif-
ferent from that in the USA, where some 200,000 horizontal gasFig. 1. The shale gas ’fracking’ process. Sourfracking wells have been in operation over the last two decades
or so (Prof. Will Fleckenstein, Colorado School of Mines, USA, pri-
vate communication 06.11.15) in comparison to just one in Britain
– at the Preese Hall site in Lancashire. In addition, the regulatory
framework is likely to be tighter in the UK, e.g., ‘flowback water’
will not be permitted to be reinjected into wells. Environmental
limits are also uniformly established across the UK and adherence
monitored by national regulators. Water use in the United States
(US), by contrast, is regulated on a State-by-State basis.
1.3. The issues considered
The possible benefits and disbenefits of shale gas fracking
include economic, environmental, safety and social consequences
[12] for the UK. Here they are discussed as an example of a ‘balance
sheet’ approach: analysis rather than advocacy. In order to draw up
an objective and rigorous set of credits and debits for shale gas
fracking (or indeed other potentially ‘disruptive’ technologies) as
part of a national dialogue, it is argued that it is desirable to bring
together experts from a wide range of disciplines to undertake
energy technology assessments (ETA) [5] that exhibit balance, objec-
tivity and broad public participation. This should draw on and
interact with national and local stakeholders: ‘actors’ both large
and small. Community engagement will consequently be critically
important for the adoption of any new energy option that might
meet the needs of a low carbon future. This contribution is part
of an ongoing research effort aimed at evaluating and optimising
the performance of various sustainable energy systems (see, for
example, Hammond et al. [13] and Hammond and Hazeldine
[14]) in the context of transition pathways [15,16] towards the
statutory target of a reduction in UK ‘greenhouse gas’ (GHG) emis-
sions by at least 80% by 2050 from 1990 levels [17]. It is aimed at
illustrating the consequences of shale gas fracking within a UK set-
ting in the light of imperfect, and sometimes contradictory, infor-
mation. Nevertheless, such assessments provide a valuable
evidence base for communities, developers, policy makers, and
other stakeholders. They also yield lessons for other European
countries attempting to extract significant quantities of shale gas
whilst attempting to decarbonise their energy systems, although
local circumstances will obviously limit the wider applicability of
the present findings.ce: adapted from Transition Haslemere.
Table 1
Estimates of shale gas potential in the UK (bcm). Sources: various estimates collated
by Bassi et al. [19]: US Energy Information Administration (EIA); Cuadrilla Resources – a
UK unconventional gas exploration company; British Geological Survey (BGS); UK
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC); Energy Contract Company (ECC) – a
UK-based commercial oil and gas consultancy.
EIA BGS/
DECC
Cuadrilla ECC
Bowland Shale Gas in place 2690 – 5660 –
Technically
recoverable
540 80–
200
900–
1200
60–
110
Weald Basin
(Liassic shale)
Gas in place 60 – – –
Technically
recoverable
30 – – –
Total UK Gas in place 2750 – – –
Technically
recoverable
570 150 – 1130
Timescale of estimates: 2011–2012.
Units: billion cubic metres (bcm).
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On the positive side of the ‘balance equation’ is the prospect
that fracking could potentially yield significant quantities of shale
gas to meet the Britain’s energy needs. In contrast (on the negative
side), the IEA [2] warn that the significant global development of
this gas would put the world on a trajectory towards a long-term
temperature rise of over 3.5 C; well above the widely suggested
’safe’ level of 2 C. The British Geological Survey (BGS) [18] has esti-
mated the possible reserves of shale gas in the Bowland-Hodder
study area or ‘play’ (encompassing national parks and major cities)
and the Weald in the South East for DECC: see Fig. 2. Bassi et al.
[19] have also collated several estimates of UK shale gas potential
that are presented in Table 1. The great uncertainties inherent in
such provisional estimates [total UK technically recoverable shale
gas reserves of 150–1130 billion cubic metres (bcm)] can only be
refined by extensive investigative drilling, possibly requiring hun-
dreds of wells [20,21]. Notwithstanding the differences between
these estimates, they suggest that UK resources are likely to be sig-
nificant compared to those elsewhere in Europe; given the morato-
rium on shale gas fracking in France and the limits on extraction in
Poland, due to geological constraints [Prof. Danny Reible, Texas
Tech University, USA, private communication 05.11.15]. However,
making assumptions about recovery rates (based on experience
at over 80,000 US horizontal shale gas fracking sites) and the pro-
portion of available resources extractable in the UK, the BGS sug-
gest [18] that recoverable shale gas resources might be
equivalent to some 25–50 years of current UK natural gas (NG)
demand. That would significantly contribute to Britain’s energy
security and independence. However, making full use of this
resource may not adhere to UK carbon budgets [22] and could risk
missing its legally-binding 2050 GHG emissions reduction target.3. Shale gas socio-economic and market issues
The UK balance of payments would obviously benefit signifi-
cantly from the large-scale development of shale gas extraction,
although it is unlikely that gas bills for household and industrial
consumers would fall dramatically as they have done in NorthFig. 2. Potential UK shale gas reserves [sites – dark shading]. SourceAmerica. This is because the USA is effectively a ‘‘natural gas
island” with very limited ‘Liquefied Natural Gas’ (LNG) imports
via the gas trading hubs of Europe [23]. In the USA, supplies of con-
ventional NG have been drying up, and unconventional gas
(including from shales) has been able to grow rapidly to meet some
60% of marketed production, according to the IEA [2]. Many US
energy analysts believe that this fall in gas prices to historically
low levels has been caused by advances in extraction techniques,
particularly fracking, driving down production costs. Much of this
shale gas production occurred as an almost ‘free’ co-product of
unconventional oil extraction. In contrast, the UK is part of the
wider European natural gas market [23] where the gas price is
determined by the supply and demand for indigenous natural
gas, imports from Russia, and LNG from North Africa and Middle
East. Shale gas supplies in the UK will only provide a small fraction
of those in this wider gas market. So the household economic ben-
efits in Britain are therefore unlikely to live up to the hopes of the
UK Prime Minister (David Cameron), who argued in the Daily Tele-
graph newspaper (11/08/13) that it would ‘‘see lower energy prices
in this country”. The British House of Commons’ Energy and Climate: adapted from Standpoint magazine, April 2012; after BGS [18].
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could reduce the risk that prices would be determined over the
longer term by imports (either via natural gas pipeline or by way
of LNG). Nevertheless, they concluded that there is substantial
uncertainty over the impact of unconventional gas extraction on
market prices. David Cameron also cited job creation as another
socio-economic benefit. That will undoubtedly follow successful
shale gas exploitation, but it is unclear whether this would be
any greater than for equivalent programmes aimed at supporting
the adoption of energy demand reduction measures (such as ther-
mal insulation or high efficiency lights and appliances) or small-
scale low carbon energy options.
A Task Force on Shale Gas (TFSG) was established in the UK in
September 2014 funded by several companies with commercial
interests in the oil, gas and chemicals sectors [Centrica, Cuadrilla
Resources, Total, The Weir Group, GDF SUEZ E&P UK Ltd., and the
Dow Chemical Company (until September 2015)]. It was led by
the former chair of the Environment Agency for England and Wales
(Lord Chris Smith) with three other ‘independent’ panel members.
However, environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
such as Friends of the Earth, and various local anti-fracking protest
groups have expressed skepticism about its claimed impartiality.
Nevertheless, it is useful to compare and contrast the findings of
the Task Force with those of the present ETA study. Its last report
[25] dealt with the potential economic impacts of shale gas extrac-
tion in Britain. The TFSG acknowledged at the outset that it is dif-
ficult to judge these effects given the uncertainties around the
potential availability of shale gas in the UK. In any event, they
recognised that such shale gas extraction would have only a min-
imal impact on the European market for similar reasons to those
suggested above. They therefore recommended the drilling of a
number of exploratory wells in order to gain a clearer picture of
recoverable shale gas in Britain. Despite the uncertainties, they
went on to argue that job creation might amount to thousands of
jobs directly and many more in the wider supply chain [25], rather
in line with the British Prime Minister’s assertion noted above.
However, the ‘Campaign against Climate Change’ Trade Union Group
has estimated (backed by eight national unions and aided by six
academic specialists) that far more jobs could be generated via
equivalent investment in developments that would mitigate GHG
emissions [26]. These ‘climate jobs’ would be created from the
adoption of energy conservation measures in the home and in pub-
lic buildings, renewable energy technologies, clean public trans-
port, and in the development of ‘green skills’ that will be
required through education and training. Based on case studies
on the Fylde (the coastal plain in western Lancashire, northern
England) and in Salford (a metropolitan borough of Greater Manch-
ester) they suggest that climate jobs could amount to some 14
times those produced directly from the fracking sector and 80
times nationally, i.e., including indirect employment creation
across the supply chain. [A breakdown of the one million ‘climate
jobs’ that might be generated by 2030 are shown in Table 2. In
addition, Neale [26] argues that half a million additional, orTable 2
Estimates of potential ‘climate job’ creation in the UK. Source: Neale [26]. A
companion technical report is available online [<http://www.campaigncc.org/sites/
data/files/Docs/online_companion_nov_2014.pdf>].
Electricity 400,000
Transport 310,000
Buildings 185,000
Industry 25,000
Education 35,000
Agriculture, waste and forestry 45,000
Total UK ‘Climate Jobs’ 1,000,000
Timescale of estimates: job creation over the period to 2030.‘spin-off’, jobs could also be created.] Such figures are only indica-
tive, although they provide an important contrast to official rheto-
ric from David Cameron and others about the prospects of
employment creation from shale gas fracking.
Perhaps the most important socio-economic issue concerns the
distribution of the benefits and costs of shale gas fracking between
various communities and demographic groups. Depending on how
much shale gas can be exploited, the UK overall could benefit from
improved energy security and reduced balance of payments, but it
is local communities that will bear most of the risks associated
with fracking. The Government intends to offset this potential
harm by encouraging (but not requiring) the extraction industry
to sign up to a charter that will guarantee payments of some
£100,000 to communities located near shale gas exploratory wells.
If the gas is ultimately exploited, then they would receive one per
cent of the resulting revenues: it has been suggested that this
might amount to some £10 million. Others have proposed the cre-
ation of some form of ‘Sovereign Wealth Fund’ (analogous to that
generated from Norwegian North Sea oil and gas revenues) to rec-
ompense affected UK regions and communities. It is obviously too
early to tell how attractive such financial incentives might be to
local communities. The Task Force on Shale Gas [25] have recom-
mended that operators explain precisely how they intend to pro-
vide the £100,000 of local community payments for exploratory
well pads and that the beneficiaries should be clearly defined.
Properties directly affected by producing wells would obviously
face the greatest disruption. The TFSG [25] therefore believe that
there should be community involvement in the development of a
‘‘fair and robust” community payments scheme.4. Induced seismicity
Great public concern over shale gas fracking was triggered in
2011 by two seismic tremors, or minor earthquakes (largest reach-
ing 2.3 ML; the local magnitude on the Richter scale), caused by
exploratory drilling at the Cuadrilla Resources site at Preese Hall
near Blackpool. Consequently, a moratorium was temporarily
placed on shale gas exploration in the UK. Subsequent studies by
DECC [27], aided by independent experts, together with a review
of the scientific and engineering evidence on shale gas extraction
undertaken by the Royal Society (RS) and the Royal Academy of Engi-
neering (RAEng) [28], found that suitable controls were available to
mitigate the risks of undesirable seismic activity. It was argued
that the most likely cause of the Preese Hall tremors was ‘induced
seismicity’; caused by the injection of fracking fluid into and along
faults that had already been under stress. The fault then shifts,
leading to perceived surface tremors. DECC subsequently
announced the introduction of a set of requirements for new con-
trols, permissions and risk assessments on fracking operations in
2012, including oversight by the Health and Safety Executive
(HSE), at Preese Hall and all future shale gas exploration wells.
They included a ‘traffic light’ seismic monitoring system, as advo-
cated in the RS/RAEng study [28] and subsequently suggested by
DECC: Green = 0.0 ML; Amber 0.0 6ML 6 0.5; and Red > 0.5 ML
[29]. Nevertheless, earth scientists (see, for example, Davies et al.
[30]) viewed the RS/RAEng fault diagnosis as incomplete, and pro-
posed the additional use of borehole imaging before injection.
Recently Westaway and Younger [31] suggested that the existing
regulatory limits applicable to quarry blasting could be readily
applied to cover such induced seismicity. They argued that future
fracking activities in the UK is only likely to cause ‘‘minor damage”,
and that seismic monitoring could be used to ‘police’ compliance
with the regulatory framework. The commercially-sponsored UK
Task Force on Shale Gas (TFSG) in their second report [32] argued
that the DECC ‘traffic light’ limits as possibly being ‘‘unfeasibly
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monitoring should be carried out as early as possible, following
the identification of a site to assess seismic risk going forward
and also to increase public confidence.
Induced seismic activity has also been linked to the re-injection
of large quantities of waste fluid post-fracking, rather than just in
the initial hydraulic fracturing process itself [33], which has led
to earthquakes of over 5 ML on the Richter scale in the US. A recent
study has linked such induced seismicity to disposal wells up to
35 km way [34], much further than previously considered. This
practice is unlikely to be carried out in the UK reducing the risk
of induced seismicity compared to the USA [29]. It is understood
[31] that the reconstituted Environment Agency (EA) in England
would not grant a permit for this method of wastewater disposal
under its current interpretation of the European Union (EU) Water
Framework Directive. However, the Task Force on Shale Gas, again in
their second report [32], suggested that there ‘‘may be situations
and circumstances – where the geology is suitable – where deep
injection is sensible, cost effective and popular preferred means
of waste disposal”. That assertion must be read with an under-
standing of the commercial interests of the sponsors of the TFSG.
In any event, adequate alternative wastewater management sys-
tems would need to put in place to safely dispose or reuse of the
resultant wastewater [35] away from the fracking site itself.5. Water use and contamination
Fracking for shale gas typically takes place at depths many hun-
dreds of metres (or several kilometres) below drinking water aqui-
fers, although such wells and acquifers do not co-occur
everywhere. Unconventional gas enthusiasts argue that there have
been no cases of groundwater contamination due to fracking in the
United States, but the US Environment Protection Agency is less con-
fident of that and its studies are therefore continuing. Hydraulic
fracturing requires large quantities of water dependent on the
properties of the shale rock involved. It ranges from 10,000–
30,000 m3 of water per fracking operation or well [36,37]. There
has consequently been a lot of publicity in the UK about the large
amounts of water used during the fracking process. The primary
water demand is for the initial hydraulic fracking process and each
subsequent fracturing step, suggesting periods of high water
demand, which could put temporal stresses on water resources
locally [28]. Excessive water use may lead to a fall in the availabil-
ity of public water supply, ecosystem degradation and adverse
effects on aquatic habitats, erosion, and changes in water temper-
ature [36]. But in the UK abstracting water will require a license
from the Environment Agency (EA) in England [or the equivalent
bodies in the other nations of the UK, i.e., Natural Resources Wales
(NRW) and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)].
The abstraction of water resources under stress should therefore
be avoided via this licensing process. Some of this water may be
recyclable, although it could be contaminated, for example, by Nat-
urally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM). The RS/RAEng report
[28] suggests that the latter are found in shales at significantly
lower levels than safe exposure limits. However, NORMs only give
rise to potential hazard if concentrated in scales, for example,
which may be precipitated on pipework. In reality, sea water exhi-
bits higher NORM concentrations than deep saline ground waters
in the UK. Nevertheless, wastewaters require careful management
and monitoring in order to ensure that NORMs do not become con-
centrated [36].
In the USA some concern has been expressed over the possibil-
ity of methane levels in water that might be high enough to be
flammable [38]. It has been asserted by DECC [38] that these are
normally caused by failures in the well construction or naturalbackground levels of methane rather than fracking per se. Indeed
the RS/RAEng review [28] considered the possibility of direct
groundwater contamination to be very unlikely, although it could
result from faulty wells. The RS/RAEng review also warned that
environmental contamination, including ’faulty wells, and leaks
and spills associated with surface operations’, were to be expected
as they are common to all oil and gas wells and extractive activi-
ties. They argued for integrated operational practices [28], such
as recycling and reusing wastewaters, to ensure benign water han-
dling and treatment. DECC [38] have put in place a series of
requirements to minimise the risk of groundwater contamination
from poorly fabricated wells. These include the need for detailed
plans to be submitted to the regulator (the EA in England, NRW
in Wales or SEPA in Scotland), together with formal risk assess-
ments [35].
US experience suggests that around 40–80% of the injected
fracking fluids will be returned to the surface as ‘flowback water’
[35,39]. This contaminated ‘produced water’ also poses a potential
risk to groundwater once it reaches the surface [37,38]. In the
event of human error or equipment failure, it could potentially leak
into streams and seep down to the groundwater. However, all dril-
ling pads are double-lined with impermeable membranes and drai-
nage is intercepted. Operators are required to dispose of flowback
fluid from wells in a safe manner. Unlike in the USA, this wastew-
ater is not permitted to be stored in open stores or disposed of by
borehole injection [28], reducing the risk of this type of environ-
mental incident in the UK. In addition, all fluids on site must be
stored in double-skinned (or integrally ‘bunded’) tanks in case of
spills. Similar hazards arise in other industrial processes, and those
associated with hydraulic fracturing should be managed appropri-
ately [10,28,40]. Thus, such risks may be ‘designed-out’ of the sys-
tem. Fracking chemicals have to be assessed by the relevant
regulator on a case-by-case basis.6. Environmental impacts
6.1. Local environmental pollution, health and related impacts
There are various local environmental impacts from shale gas
fracking: the excessive water use, groundwater contamination
and wastewater handling as discussed above, as well as noise,
odours, and the disposal of solid wastes. In order to prevent con-
tamination, the integrity of fracking wells must be ensured. Guide-
lines for achieving this were recommended in the RS/RAEng report
[28], which are largely reflected in documents produced by the
American Petroleum Institute and the HSE that are recommended
by DECC [41]. It is believed that properly designed wells should
not pose a risk of contamination to underground aquifers [41]. Of
course regulation, however good, is ineffective without rigorous
enforcement backed by seriously deterrent penalties. Both well
design and construction are overseen by an Independent Well Exam-
iner and the HSE Wells Inspector. No operation can commence
before an inspection by the independent examiner (employed by
the operating company or a contractor) who oversees the design,
construction and maintenance of a well [42]. However fully inde-
pendent monitoring of the wells which was recommended by the
RS/RAEng report was rejected during the enactment of the UK
Infrastructure Act 2015 [43], primarily leaving the reporting of leak-
ages up to the operating company. Furthermore, the monitoring or
management of abandoned wells remains unclear, particularly if
an operator becomes insolvent [42].
The (Smith) Task Force on Shale Gas, in their second report deal-
ing with local environmental impacts [32], advocated that baseline
monitoring of air, land and water should begin as soon as a poten-
tial shale gas fracking site had been identified, rather than waiting
Fig. 3. Central estimates for upstream GHG emissions associated with unconven-
tional gas compared to current UK gas mix.
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ommended that the adoption of the recently mandated US process
of ‘green completions’ or ‘reduced emissions completions’, whereby
the shale gas and associated hydrocarbons is separated from the
remaining ‘flowback fluid’ and the rest of the fluid to be transferred
on for further processing, as a compulsory framework for explora-
tory sites in the UK [32]. This process is claimed to reduce ‘fugitive
emissions’ by around 90%. The TFSG recognised that green comple-
tions may not be feasible for exploratory wells in Britain, and that
some flaring might be required. In that event, operators could con-
vert gas to electricity onsite and link it to the grid as an alternative,
more acceptable, option [32].
There are, in addition, aesthetic concerns: visual intrusion of the
sort that also results from onshore wind turbine developments.
Shale gas fracking requires site operations at the wellhead, as well
as the collection and distribution of unconventional gas from the
site [44]. Public resistance often focuses on the increased traffic
and vehicle exhaust emissions and noise, particularly those ema-
nating from heavy road transport vehicles. Indeed, the first plan-
ning application to explore shale gas in the UK was rejected by
Lancashire councillors [the local authority in that part of the north
west of England (see again Fig. 2)] on the grounds of increased
noise and visual impact [44]. Drilling often takes place on land-
scapes of natural beauty that include sensitive wildlife habitats
[45]. The Infrastructure Act 2015 [43] prohibits hydraulic fracturing
from taking place in land at a depth of less than 1000 m, whilst
ensuring that communities benefit and that the UK has a robust
regulatory regime. The UK government had originally ‘‘agreed an
outright ban on fracking in national parks, sites of special scientific
interest (SSI) and areas of outstanding natural beauty” [45], but
have subsequently made changes to these exclusion zones arguing
that it could hamper this nascent industry. Surface-level fracking
operations are prohibited in environmentally-sensitive areas, such
as National Parks, Areas of Outstanding National Beauty (AONB), the
Norfolk Broads, World Heritage Sites, and those where groundwa-
ter supplies may be at risk [46]. Sites of Special Scientific Interest
(SSI) will no longer be excluded from the exploration of shale gas
under these new terms. These changes were met by significant
concern from environmental groups over the risk posed to some
of the UK’s most important wildlife sites. Operational environmen-
tal permits for shale gas fracking in the UK are issued by the EA,
NRW, or the SEPA (as appropriate) on a site-by-site basis in line
with the requirements imposed in water abstraction licenses, and
actual usage monitored over time.
6.2. Climate change and fugitive emissions
The 2008 UK Climate Change Act [17] set a legally binding target
of reducing the nation’s GHG emissions overall by 80% by 2050 in
comparison to a 1990 baseline. In order to meet this reduction tar-
get, the Government’s independent Committee on Climate Change
has suggested that the electricity generation sector will effectively
need to be decarbonised by 2030. Gas-fired power stations emit far
fewer greenhouse gases per unit of electricity output than coal-
fired ones and, for this reason, they are favoured by Helm [47] as
a transitional energy option. However, if the UK continues to build
and operate gas-fired power stations, the power sector will be
locked-in to a fossil fuel technology and unable to decarbonise over
the lifetime of these gas-fired power plants unless paired with car-
bon capture facilities. Unfortunately, the UK Government recently
cancelled (on 25 November 2015) their £1bn CCS competition,
which suggests that this technology may have an uncertain future
in Britain. A CCS option would add extra cost to power generation
and also constitute a significant risk of climate change policy fail-
ure. Many scientists, policy makers and journalists attributed the
7% reduction in US domestic carbon emissions between 2007 and2013 to the fuel switch from coal to shale gas. But recent analysis
suggested that it in fact only played a small role in this fall, with
much of the reduction attributed to the economic recession [48].
Two of the main sources of global warming impact arising from
shale gas development are the fugitive methane emissions leaked
and vented during extraction processes, and carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions from the combustion of the shale gas to produce elec-
tricity. Like conventional gas, the primary cause of these GHG
emissions result from the combustion of the shale gas in boilers.
However, there is a greater variation in fugitive methane emissions
from the extraction process, depending on the given location, par-
ticularly in terms of enforced environmental legislation. Therefore,
much of the controversy over the global warming impact of shale
gas technology focuses on such fugitive methane. Methane is a
much more powerful GHG than CO2, although it resides in the
atmosphere for only 12 years [49]. Some of it may be flared (con-
verting it to CO2), rather than vented, but this is not or cannot
always be done.
The most recent values of Global Warming Potential (GWP) for
GHGs are provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) in their Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) over three sep-
arate time horizons [50]: 20, 100 and 500 year respectively. The
application of the three different time horizons are all equally valid
for assessing GHGs from a scientific perspective. However, short-
lived, more potent GHG emissions have a much higher GWP over
the 20 year horizon; consequently methane traps 86 times more
heat than carbon over this period, compared to 34 over a 100 year
horizon [50]. Some have argued that it might be more pertinent to
consider methane emissions over the 20 year horizon to assess the
danger it poses to our climate system in the short-term. Neverthe-
less, the 100 year horizon has been widely used by many, provid-
ing a balance between short-term and long-term impact of GHGs
on climate change. Furthermore, this is particularly appropriate
given that CO2 accumulates over time in the atmosphere, whereas
methane dissipates. Accordingly, the results presented in this
assessment of the life-cycle GHG emissions from shale gas are over
a 100 year time horizon.
Upstream GHG emissions estimated by several studies have
been collated [51–57] in order to explore the potential ‘carbon
footprint’ of UK shale gas (see Fig. 3). The controversial study by
Howarth et al. [53] was excluded when averaging this data,
because of its relatively high estimates for fugitive emissions.
Should rigorous and effective environmental legislation be intro-
duced in the UK, this level of emissions is unlikely to be permitted.
Emissions data from the Ecoinvent database version 2.2 [58] were
used to account for UK NGwhen generating the latter mix; for both
domestic and imported UK fuel routes [from Norway, the Nether-
lands, the rest of the European Union (EU), and via LNG]. The full
G.P. Hammond, Á. O’Grady / Applied Energy 185 (2017) 1907–1918 1913life-cycle GHG emissions of shale gas electricity generation are
compared to the NG generation using the current UK gas mix,
LNG and Russian gas respectively in Fig. 4. The LNG emissions data
were taken from a review undertaken previously by Hammond and
O’Grady [59]. The operational (or ‘stack’) emissions are based on
current UK technology, but may fall over time as more efficient
plants come online. Total life-cycle emissions of shale gas genera-
tion were estimated to be in the range of 480–546 gCO2e/kW he,
i.e., 4–18% greater than emissions from the current UK gas mix
(with a central estimate of 14% greater GHG emissions). Thus, pro-
viding effective regulation to curtail fugitive emissions are in place,
electricity generation using shale gas could offer significant savings
in carbon emissions when displacing coal-fired generation as part
of a transitional energy strategy [59]. This result is in keeping with
other estimates found in literature [51,54] and a study carried out
by DECC [60], which saw a moderate disparity between conven-
tional and unconventional gas. There are large uncertainties asso-
ciated with these findings, and they should only be considered as
‘indicative’ until real operational data are available.
GHG emissions from shale gas are currently higher than that
associated with the UK gas mix, although shale gas may offer less
GWP than its counterparts as the UK gas supply mix evolves over
time, according to Hammond and O’Grady [59]. Over the coming
years, both indigenous and European gas supply will decline, leav-
ing the UK more reliant on imports such as LNG and Russian pipe-
line gas. LNG was found [59] to be 8–26% greater in terms of GHG
emissions than the current UK gas mix, while Russian gas was seen
to produce 25% higher emissions. These gas supplies from distant
regions require long transportation routes through pipelines,
which results in high fugitive emissions [61], or they must undergo
liquefaction, shipping and regasification: all energy intensive pro-
cesses that result in additional GHGs being emitted. The develop-
ment of a UK shale gas industry could decrease the share of
these impactful gases in the future UK gas mix, but are likely to
impede the penetration of biomethane, which could still result in
increased emissions [59]. Similarly, the growth in UK shale gas
may provide a cheap supply of gas that could greatly reduce the
investment in renewables, and devalue efforts to adhere to carbon
budgets.
Sensitivity analysis performed in connection with shale gas
studies have shown large ranges in the impact of shale gas, partic-
ularly in terms of fugitive emissions and the estimated ultimate
recovery per well [62–65]. Hence, without effective regulation
(backed by rigorous enforcement and seriously deterrent penal-
ties) to minimise these fugitive methane emission, many of the
notional advantages of shale gas may not be realised. An interest-
ing study in the specific context of the Central Belt of Scotland [65]
found that significantly greater methane emissions are likely toFig. 4. Life-cycle GHG emissions for gas generation with different gas sources.arise from shale gas extraction on peatland, in contrast to grassland
development typical of the English landscape. However, compar-
isons between the full chain GHG emissions from conventional
and shale gas were taken from the DECC study [60] mentioned
above. Legislation to address fugitive methane from shale gas have
not yet been specified in the UK, but it is likely that they will be
treated in the same manner as fugitive methane from current UK
oil and gas production. Consent for venting or flaring in this sector
(reserved mainly for maintenance and emergency procedures)
must be granted by DECC [66], who are committed to keeping
these emissions to a technical and economic minimum. It would
be desirable for such ‘green completion’ techniques, which were
also advocated in the second report of the (Smith) Task Force on
Shale Gas [31], to be mandated during both the explorative and
operational phases of the well in order to keep fugitive emissions
at an absolute minimum.
The third report of the Task Force on Shale Gas (TFSG), published
in mid-September 2015, dealt with the climate change impact of
shale gas development in the UK [67]. It suggested again that this
would be similar to that for conventional gas, provided that the
British shale gas sector is ‘‘properly regulated” and monitored,
and lower than those associated with LNG. They advocated techno-
logical innovation and RD&D investment in CCS alongside the
extraction of shale gas as a climate change mitigation option. This,
they believe, would enable gas to play a transition role in the UK
energy mix in the medium-term as advocated by Helm [47] and
others [59]. Nevertheless, the TFSG argued that the sector should
not prohibit the development of low-carbon energy generation
(particularly from renewables), storage and distribution [67]. Just
a little after the date that the third report of the TFSG was
launched, so too was a review of GHG emissions from conventional
and unconventional sources of natural gas over their respective full
supply chains [68] by the Sustainable Gas Institute (SGI; based at
Imperial College London with industrial funding from BG Group).
These sources included conventional onshore and offshore, shale
gas, tight sands, and coal bed methane (CBM). It drew on findings
from some 400 papers in order to evaluate the emissions emanat-
ing from various extraction, processing and transport routes; albeit
mainly based on data from North America. Comparisons were col-
lated between the full chain GHG emissions from conventional and
unconventional gas. It found that over the complete range of gas
supplies the total GHG emissions associated with electricity gener-
ation was 419–636 gCO2e/kW he (with a central estimate of
496 gCO2e/kW he), which the SGI considered to be well below typ-
ical GHG estimates for coal-fired power plants of around
1000 gCO2e/kW he. These embrace the range of full chain emissions
found from the present study above, although they are obviously
much broader that shale gas data. Unfortunately, the SGI figures
were not disaggregated in terms of fuel type (e.g., conventional
versus shale gas for the current purposes).
6.3. Comparing environmental burdens from different life-cycle impact
categories
Climate change is the primary focus of most of these studies of
shale gas, with little attention given to its wider environmental
implications. The first life-cycle assessment was only recently con-
ducted by Stamford and Azapagic [64] but has generated some con-
troversy in theway their resultshavebeen represented in themedia:
as, for example, ‘‘fracking trumps renewables” [according to aMedia
Release by the UK Institution of Chemical Engineers in theirmembers’
magazine (‘The Chemical Engineer’) http://aboutdatajournalism.
org/tcetoday-news-lca-shows-fracking-trumps-renewables/]. This
is because the authors examined a variety of life-cycle impact
categories in addition to climate change (for which their central
estimate was 462 gCO2e/kW he) with varying results between other
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conventional gas, nuclear power and renewables in terms of the
depletion of abiotic resources and eutrophication, as well as fresh-
water, marine and human toxicities. In contrast, they found shale
gas to be more environmentally damaging when photochemical
smog and terrestrial toxicity were examined; both, of course, are
associated with increased human mortality. Nevertheless, carbon
footprints have become the ‘currency’ of debate in a climate-
constrained world [59], where the UK is seeking to dramatically
reduce its carbon emissions by 2050. It is therefore of greater signif-
icance than these other (important, although perhaps not critical)
impact categories. In that regard, shale gas fracking certainly does
not ‘‘trump renewables”.
Stamford and Azapagic’s study [64] has attracted other criti-
cisms, including that by Westaway et al. [69]. The latter expressed
doubt over some assumptions taken in a UK context in regards to
drilling waste disposal, well completion, and the Estimated Ultimate
Recovery (EUR) of the wells. Westaway et al. argued that Stamford
and Azapagic assumed that practices that carried out in the USA,
that have long been illegal in the UK (and EU generally), would
potentially be used by the shale gas industry in Britain. However,
Stamford and Azapagic stressed that the large uncertainties
involved in their work was due to the nascent nature of the British
shale gas industry. Despite the criticisms, their study [64] demon-
strates the high sensitivity of the LCA results to particular param-
eters of shale gas, reporting large ranges in life-cycle impacts for
UK shale gas. It is critical that robust environmental data is col-
lected as an industry grows in Britain, with strong collaboration
between operators and the EA.
In view of the early stage of UK shale gas development and of
the consequent scarcity of country-specific data, baseline monitor-
ing studies are being planned and undertaken in order to provide
GHG emissions and related data over the British supply chain
employing airborne, remote sensing, sampling, and sensor network
methods. Thus, Allen et al. [70] have obtained and validated
trace-gas-concentration and thermodynamic profiles throughout
the troposphere and planetary boundary layer using data from air-
craft campaigns over and around London. Similarly, Sommariva
et al. [71] have taken shale samples from the Bowland-Hodder
formation (in northern England) in order to determine, using mass
spectrometry, methane and non-methane hydrocarbons (NMHCs).
Their results indicate that high temperatures significantly increase
the amount of NMHCs released from shale, whilst humidity tends
to suppress them. A large fraction of the gas is also released within
the first hour after the shale has been fractured. Clearly,
much more needs to be done in terms of basic data gathering for
real-world hydraulic fracturing operations in the UK. Such
data would help reduce uncertainty and allow the potential
environmental impact of UK shale gas to be more accurately
determined.7. Public and stakeholder engagement
UK Government Ministers have indicated their concern over
the fierce resistance to their shale gas fracking policies; particu-
larly from rural communities in both the south and north of Eng-
land. Potential sites stretch all the way from Dorset to the Kent
borders (across the south), via the Bowland-Hodder (in northern
England), to at least the Midland Valley of Scotland (see again
Fig. 2). There are also potential shale gas reserves in Wales,
although there is a relative paucity of data for the Principality.
Initial concerns were raised in northern England as a result of
induced seismicity caused by exploratory drilling at Preese Hall.
Such communities need to be engaged in a two-way dialogue
aimed at clarifying the impacts of the shale gas fracking process,along with its potential costs and benefits. Challenges to energy
infrastructural developments in the form of local activism have
typically been led by groups, such as the Green Parties (of the
nations of the UK) and environmental campaigning organisations,
like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, as well as various nature
conservation bodies. Public opposition could prove to be a ‘show-
stopper’ for this energy option unless the various stakeholders
are engaged in an appropriate consultation. Pigdeon et al. [72]
recently examined some of the critical issues concerning the
design and conduct of public deliberation processes on energy
policy matters of national importance. In order to develop their
argument, they employed as an illustrative case study, some of
their earlier work on public values and attitudes toward future
UK energy system change. They note that national-level policy
issues are often inherently complex; involving multiple intercon-
nected elements and frames, analysis over extended scales, and
different (often high) levels of uncertainty. It is their view that
facilitators should engage the public in terms of ‘whole systems’
thinking at the problem scale, provide balanced information and
policy framings, and use different approaches that encourage par-
ticipants to reflect and deliberate on the issues. This is similar to
what is often referred to as interactive, participatory methods by
the technology assessment community [3–5].
DECC has engaged in a process of evaluation of public attitudes
to various energy technologies [73], including shale gas fracking.
They have commissioned periodic surveys of just over 2000 face-
to-face in-home interviews with adults over 16 years of age by spe-
cialists from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) in a series, or
wave, of studies. The most recent (August 2015) survey [73] indi-
cated that around ¾ of the British public were aware of fracking,
although only 14% indicated that they knew a significant amount
about the process. Of the sample, some 46% were neither support-
ers nor opponents of extracting shale gas. Those that offered an
opinion indicated that around 28% were opposed, whereas 21%
supported of the exploitation of this technology. DECC have sug-
gested, on the basis of the ONS survey, that support for fracking
is related to awareness with 54% of those who claim a lot of knowl-
edge being opposed to the technology (in contrast to 32% in favour
of shale gas fracking) [73].
An academic study of UK public perceptions of shale gas frack-
ing by O’Hara et al. [74] has attracted a lot of attention amongst
social scientists and policy makers in Britain [37]. It included anal-
ysis of policy documents and media sources, semi-structured inter-
views, and a series of seven nation-wide surveys over the period
2012–2013. The initial survey indicated that 37% of respondents
were familiar with shale gas extraction, but this rose to over 60%
and then flattened out. This latter phenomenon occurred in spite
of a significant increase in media coverage of fracking over this per-
iod, particularly via the BBC. O’Hara et al. [74] found that respon-
dents under 25 years of age were least aware of shale gas
extraction and its implications. Over 58% of people thought that
it would aid energy security, although respondents answered
‘don’t know’ to questions about how shale gas development would
impact in terms of climate change. The majority of people who
were familiar with the process felt that it should be permitted.
Another recent, detailed experimental (online) survey of public
perceptions of shale gas fracking in the UK (N = 1457) by Whit-
marsh et al. [75], included analysis of the effects of different mes-
sages on support for, or risk perceptions of, shale gas fracking. They
found that the public were generally ambivalent about shale gas,
but perceived more risks than benefits. This was strongly influ-
enced by demographic, political and environmental considerations
and values. The study [75] discovered that prior knowledge of
shale gas extraction had the greatest impact on those respondents
who were initially ambivalent or ‘undecided’, which suggested an
important role for information and awareness raising.
G.P. Hammond, Á. O’Grady / Applied Energy 185 (2017) 1907–1918 1915The (Smith) Task Force on Shale Gas also considered matters
around local engagement in their first report [76]. They proposed
the establishment of a community engagement plan by operators
(albeit with local community involvement) and the full disclosure
of information to the local community before an application is sub-
mitted to the appropriate regulator. The latter should include logis-
tic and broad site access issues [76], such as the likely number and
size of transport movements over the life of a potential drill pad.
The British Geological Survey has been involved in practical activi-
ties associated with public engagement about shale gas fracking
[Dr. Robert Ward, BGS, UK, private communication 06.11.15]. They
have advocated interaction much in line with that recommended
by TFSG [76] although, in addition, the BGS stress the need to uti-
lise tailor-made approaches for different areas/groups, as well as
the importance of keeping ‘‘information up-to-date, fresh and
understandable”. Further elaboration of such surveys, employing
the deliberative framework proposed by Pigdeon et al. [72], might
go some way towards securing better awareness and understand-
ing of hydraulic fracturing by the public in general.8. Planning, regulation and monitoring
One set of issues for which politicians of different persuasions
and community groups agree on is the important need for ade-
quate measures in the area of unconventional gas planning and
regulation. Nevertheless, it has yet to be determined whether what
community groups consider ‘effective regulation’ will be accepted
and upheld by the government. For instance, many local groups are
opposed to recent moves by the UK Government to facilitate plan-
ning permission for fracking by preventing landowners objecting
to the process taking place under their land [77]. DECC issues
licenses to onshore oil and gas operators for exclusive drilling
rights, and have listed a long set of pre-drilling approvals that
are needed from the various regulators [1]. Operators are required
to obtain planning permission from the appropriate UK minerals
planning authority (county council or unitary authorities in Eng-
land and the planning authorities in Scotland and Wales) and seek
access to the site from landowners [1].
The Environment Agency (EA) in England is currently undergoing
a consultation to define new standard permits for onshore oil and
gas [78]. The process of applying for permits to drill and carry out
preliminary testing of wells would be streamlined by removing
public consultation. Although a separate permit for hydraulic frac-
turing will still be required, this has been seen by many as a move
to simplify the process and reduce costs for operators. It has also
been argued that prior independent [28,32] evaluations of well
integrity should be undertaken before drilling can commence, fol-
lowed by mandated disclosure of hazardous incidents, ongoing
process monitoring and contamination assessments. Public Health
England (PHE) [79], for example, have recently proposed that base-
line environmental monitoring be instigated in order to facilitate
the impact assessment of shale gas extraction on the environment
and public health, that the fracking chemicals (including NORMs)
should be publicly disclosed and their risks assessed before use,
and that the type and composition of the extracted gas should be
determined on a site-by-site basis. This was criticised by a group
of medical specialists from the US [80], who argued that it was
based on the idea that many of the public health problems experi-
enced in the USA would be replicated in a more densely populated
country like Britain. Law et al. [80] suggest that these impacts as
yet remain undetermined and require further scientific study using
rigorous, quantitative epidemiological methods. However, the UK
Task Force on Shale Gas [31] generally agreed with the PHE recom-
mendations, but also proposed that the Government should estab-
lish a ‘National Advisory Committee’ of independent academicexperts to monitor data from shale gas operations in order to eval-
uate health impacts.
The TFSG examined planning and regulatory issues in their first
report [76]. Their main recommendation was that the UK Govern-
ment should explore the possibility of creating a new, bespoke reg-
ulator for onshore underground energy (unconventional oil and
gas, including CBM) that would take over the current regulatory
responsibilities of the Environment Agency (and its national coun-
terparts), the Health & Safety Executive, and DECC. The (Smith) Task
Force also suggested [76] that full-scale ‘environmental impact
assessments’, which they view as being not easily accessible,
should be replaced by ‘environmental risk assessments’ [35]. The
TFSG argued [76] that the latter methodology would be ‘‘more suc-
cinct and approachable” for use by the new regulator in a way that
could be made readily available to local communities.9. Concluding remarks
An energy technology assessment (ETA) has been undertaken
[3–5,13,14] in order to evaluate the credit and debit ‘columns’ of
the shale gas fracking ‘balance sheet’. The adoption of this extrac-
tion technology is at a very early stage in the UK with great uncer-
tainty over the scale of the potential shale gas resource. An
extensive programme of investigative drilling across the country
will therefore be needed in order to provide reliable estimates;
possibly requiring hundreds of exploratory wells [20,21]. Never-
theless, the successful exploitation of large-scale development of
shale gas extraction in the UK might contribute positively in terms
of fuel security and independence, as well as jobs and growth, pro-
viding the potentially harmful ‘side-effects’ outlined here can be
satisfactorily resolved. But it is unclear whether job creation would
be any greater than that arising from equivalent programmes
aimed at supporting the adoption of energy demand reduction
measures or small-scale low carbon energy options. Similarly, the
UK balance of payments would benefit, although it is unlikely that
gas bills for household and industrial consumers would fall dra-
matically as they have done in North America. This is because
the UK is part of the wider European natural gas market [23,37]
where the gas price is determined by the supply and demand for
indigenous natural gas, imports from Russia, and LNG from North
Africa. Unconventional gas supplies in the UK will be only be a
small fraction of those in this wider market. Lessons from the pre-
sent ETA study will therefore also apply in general across the Euro-
pean Union, albeit tailored by local circumstances.
Hydraulic fracturing requires significant quantities of water
which may potentially lead to a fall in the availability of public
water supply, ecosystem degradation and adverse effects on aqua-
tic habitats, erosion, and changes in water temperature [28]. How-
ever, abstracting water in the UK will require a license from the
Environment Agency (EA) in England [or the equivalent bodies in
the other nations of the UK, i.e., NRW and SEPA]. The abstraction
of water resources under stress should therefore be avoided via
this licensing process. Recycled fracking fluid could be used for
ongoing fracking operations [35,36], except that a proportion of
this is not recovered. In the USA some concern has been expressed
over the possibility of methane levels in water that might be high
enough to be flammable. It has been asserted by DECC [38] that the
high methane levels found in some US drinking water supplies
were caused by failures in the well construction or natural back-
ground levels of methane, rather than fracking per se. They have
put in place minimum requirements to avoid groundwater con-
tamination from poorly fabricated wells. Fracking chemicals have
to be assessed by the appropriate regulator (EA, NRW or SEPA)
on a case-by-case basis [79]. Operators are required to dispose of
‘flowback fluid’ from well in a safe manner.
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be lower than that of coal-fired power generators providing strin-
gent regulation is implemented to minimise fugitive methane
emissions. On the other hand, the life-cycle carbon footprint was
found to be slightly higher than conventional gas, and considerably
higher than nuclear power and renewables. It could therefore form
part of a transitional UK energy strategy [47,59], although this
might jeopardise the attainment of a low (near zero) carbon tran-
sition pathway by 2050. The penetration of shale gas into the UK
energy mix would likely lead to the lock-in of gas-fired power gen-
eration for some decades. Furthermore, without the large-scale use
of carbon capture and storage (CCS) [81], such a transition would be
incompatible with meeting legislated carbon budgets and limiting
GHG concentrations to a ’safe’ level [82].
The socio-economic benefits and costs of shale gas fracking are
not evenly distributed between various communities and demo-
graphic groups. Thus, the UK overall might benefit from improved
energy security and reduced balance of payments, whilst it will be
local communities that bear any adverse environmental and health
risks of fracking. Induced seismicity caused by the injection of
fracking fluid into and along faults that are already under stress
can lead to minor earthquakes or surface tremors. DECC have intro-
duced a set of requirements for new controls, permissions and risk
assessments on fracking operations in 2012, based on a ‘traffic
light’ system [27–29] to monitor unusual seismic activity. How-
ever, several prominent UK earth scientists have argued [30,31]
that future fracking activities in the UK are only likely to cause ‘mi-
nor damage’; yet again, provided a robust regulatory framework is
put in place. Local environmental impacts are critical to neighbour-
ing communities near the wellhead. They focus on shale fracking
site operations, as well as the collection and distribution of uncon-
ventional gas from the wellhead [44,47]. Public resistance has been
largely concerned about increased traffic, which causes vehicle
exhaust emissions and noise [79], particularly those emanating
from heavy road transport vehicles. In addition, drilling places
environmental burdens on landscapes that are often in areas of
natural beauty with sensitive wildlife habitats [47].
In order to draw up an objective and rigorous ‘balance sheet’ for
the fracking of shale gas (or indeed other critical technologies) as
part of a national dialogue, it would be desirable to bring together
experts from a range of disciplines in order to carry out the neces-
sary ETAs. They would need to interact with national and local
stakeholders: ‘actors’ both large and small. That work should be
seen by the wider community as analysis and not advocacy. The
UK Coalition Government, when it came into office in 2010, unfor-
tunately closed down or withdrew funding from a number of inde-
pendent, ‘arms-length’ bodies established by government
departments (sometimes known by the term ‘quasi-autonomous
non-governmental organisations’, or ‘Quangos’) who might have
been capable of conducting studies of this type. Two such bodies
were the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution and the Sus-
tainable Development Commission. It is unlikely that the present
government would re-establish these organisations, but perhaps
a future government might consider establishing an alternative.
One model might be the Office of Technology Assessment at the Ger-
man Bundestag (TAB), or the equivalent bodies in the Scandinavian
countries [4]. In the present context, a new UK agency might look
wider than just the scientific and engineering issues, bringing
together the technical with the social science perspectives. The lat-
ter would be critically important in obtaining insights from various
stakeholder groups. That would guard against unwanted side-
effects by identifying them in advance of deployment, and could
go some way towards engaging and reassuring the community.
Constraints on the exploration for unconventional gas are likely
to be as much about public acceptance as they are about the vari-
ous technical issues [72–76]. Community engagement in a gen-uinely participative process will consequently be critically
important for the adoption of any new energy option [3,4] that
might meet the needs of a low carbon future. That is certainly
one lesson from the shale gas fracking controversy.Acknowledgements
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